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Abstract 
In recent years new developments in the railway market have brought about several new insights 
about the effects of competition in the sector. In the context of a workshop in Madrid organised 
by the UNED University in the realm of the research project REGUTRAIN, some practical cases 
in Europe were discussed. New entrants that offer competitive passenger rail services have 
brought down prices and increased frequencies significantly in several instances. Yet, the debate 
showed that whether these developments are beneficial for the system on the whole remains an 
open question. 
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Introduction 
 
A Workshop on the European experience of competition in the railway passenger market was 
held on 16th September 2016 in the Fundación de los Ferrocarriles Españoles in Madrid. The 
workshop was organised by the UNED University in the realm of the research project 
REGUTRAIN, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology. 
Experts from Austria, Italy, the Czech Republic, United Kingdom and Sweden participated in the 
Workshop. They presented the national experiences of competition “in the market” or so called 
“open access”, that is, competition of more than one undertaking in the provision of passenger 
transport services along the same route, as opposed to competition “for the market”1. Table 1 
illustrates the state of play of open access competition in the railway sector. 
 
Table 1 Open Access Operators (OAO) and market share in Europe. 
 
Source: Competition and Market Authority (CMA) (2016), p.86 
 
Some lessons can be learnt from the experience of those countries where competition in the 
market was introduced. We would identify three lessons: Firstly competition is limited to a few 
                                                        
 
1 The introduction of competition in the railway sector raised a number of questions, and many categories and 
definitions have been used. For an overview, refer to Finger, M., Rosa, A. (2012)  
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lines and a few competitors. Secondly competition has a positive impact for the passengers and 
thirdly competition can have a negative impact on the system as a whole. 
Competition is limited to a few lines and a few competitors 
The first conclusion is that competition tends to be limited to a few key routes and among a very 
small number of competitors. 
In each county, new competitors tend to focus on the busiest routes, which are usually the lines 
with the best infrastructure and achieving the highest speeds. In fact, in Austria and the Czech 
Republic new comers operate only a single route, which is always the busiest in the country. In 
the Italian case, presented by Andrea Giuricin, the new entrant also began operations exclusively 
on the Rome-Milan line in 2011. Since then, it has begun operations on other lines, but always 
with high passenger volume (such as Milan-Venice). 
The number of new entrants is also very limited. In Austria and Italy, only a single newcomer 
competes with the traditional public railway undertaking. In the Czech Republic, as explained by 
Zdeněk Tomeš, three undertakings now compete on the busiest line in the country. 
A positive impact for the passengers 
A second conclusion is that the introduction of competition has led to a drastic reduction in 
prices, increased frequency of services and, therefore, a significant increase in passenger volume. 
The impact on prices has been very marked. Average prices have dropped sharply in all countries: 
-42% in the Czech Republic and -40% in Italy, and, furthermore, quite suddenly after the 
introduction of competition, in the case of Sweden, as explained by Bertil Hylén. In addition, 
there have been very dramatic discounts resulting from innovative pricing policies. 
The frequency of service has also improved, although the new frequencies tend to concentrate at 
peak times and not nearly so much in non-peak hours, especially in services late in the day, when 
there is a tendency to advance the last departure to an earlier time.  
The volume of travellers has increased dramatically in most countries, with the most notable 
being in the Czech Republic (+ 91%) and Italy (+ 65%). However, part of the increase should be 
attributed to other factors, as noted by Dietmar Pfeiler explaining the Austrian case, namely 
improvement in infrastructure, limitations in the air or road alternatives offered, etc. 
Negative impacts on the system 
Competition also seems to have caused some negative effects on the railway system, which must 
be considered for the correct and proper regulation of the activity. 
Price reductions can be larger than the efficiency gains resulting from competition. Even more, in 
some cases unit costs per passenger may increase, resulting from the tendency to offer greater 
frequency with smaller trains and, perhaps, with lower occupancy rates. Increased frequency with 
lower capacity also involves congestion problems in infrastructure. 
As a result, liberalisation has meant a greater financial pressure on the system, causing a chain of 
consequences, all of which were largely predictable. 
To begin with, the financial pressure on railway undertakings has led to the deterioration of 
services on other routes. The customary cross-subsidisation within a public undertaking between 
the most and least profitable routes has been reduced significantly. This effect has been clearly 
observed in the Czech Republic and in particular in Italy, where the public railway undertaking 
suspended long distance services in deficit (as they did not benefit from any compensation 
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resulting from public service obligations) just before the entry of a new competitor into the 
market. 
In the same vein, the financial pressure on railway undertakings has also been tempered by the 
reduction of fees for the use of the railway infrastructure. This is the case in Italy where the 
infrastructure management was forced to assume a greater share of the cost of the system. 
Finally, despite the measures indicated above, it should be noted that competition has caused 
public undertakings to assume losses on lines that were previously highly profitable, and new 
comers also face a high risk of incurring losses over a prolonged period, although the more 
mature competitors in Italy and the Czech Republic appear to be stabilising their financial 
situation. 
Conclusion 
In most of the countries analysed, liberalisation was not the result of a policy designed to achieve 
specific objectives. Indeed, in the case of Sweden liberalisation was considered to have occurred 
by accident. As a result, liberalisation was not accompanied by regulatory measures to ensure 
specific objectives. This was not so in the British case, which, as Phillip Wheat explained, 
originally was clearly aimed at reducing the system’s operating costs. It should be noted that over 
time, the costs have increased and the franchise model has failed to control the evolution of costs. 
Unregulated competition has generated obvious benefits in the form of price reductions for 
travellers on competitive routes. However, these reductions have not necessarily been 
accompanied by a parallel reduction in the economic cost of the system. In fact, it has become 
evident that the introduction of competition usually presents a parallel trend to shift costs to the 
infrastructure manager and to the users of other routes that cannot benefit anymore of internal 
cross-subsidies. Yet further competition causes financial stresses to both the public railway 
undertakings and the new participants in the market. 
It may be of interest to have a greater regulatory intervention to combine the benefits of 
competition with a reduced negative impact on the system, at least for a transitory period. 
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Case Study 1 - Passenger Railway Competition in Austria 
This text is based on the presentation of Dietmar Pfeiler, ÖBB, at the workshop “Competition in the 
Railway Passenger Market”, Madrid, 16.09.2016 and the other sources referenced in the text. 
 
Open access competition in Austria took off in December 2011 on the Vienna-Salzburg route, the 
country’s busiest connection that, so far, remains the only case of open access competition in the 
country. The private operator Westbahn was founded already in 2008 but faced several difficulties 
in the beginning filing complaints among other about allegedly discriminatory access to essential 
facilities by the infrastructure manager ÖBB Infrastruktur AG, which is part of the integrated 
ÖBB Holding. In spite of having access to Vienna’s main station Westbahn is operating uniquely 
from Vienna’s Westbahnhof. The train cars Westbahn uses were requested from and provided 
bythe manufacturer Stadler Rail (CH). 
Open access competition in Austria is legally possible for every path upon the request of a 
licensed Railway Undertaking. The priority rules of the path allocation process can be an obstacle 
as Austria has a mix-use network with long-distance, local and freight trains using the same 
tracks. 
Open access competition seems to have had several effects on the passenger railway market in 
Austria: 
-­‐   Increase in demand: the overall passenger rail transport demand has risen by 25% over the 
last three years on the Vienna-Salzburg-route. The overall market volume of the incumbent 
ÖBB, however, has remained stable since 2011. In 2013 the market share of Westbahn on the 
Salzburg Vienna route was between 20-25% which is equal to a national share of about 3% 
(Casullo, 2016). 
-­‐   Quality of Service: in terms of extra services, from the beginning Westbahn offered free Wifi 
on their trains, it allowed on board ticket sales and special discounts. Today the incumbent is 
also offering Wifi on their high speed trains. However, as the competition is mainly focussed 
on price competition an overall reduction of service quality is a possible trend. 
-­‐   Capacity and travel time: Westbahn offers 15 train pairs per day, with standard travel-time of 
2h28min (7 intermediate stops) and 2h16min/2h19min for early-morning-services with two 
intermediate stops. ÖBB offers two hourly lines to Salzburg, both with 16 pairs of trains each. 
The fast railjet line with a travel time of 2h15min (two intermediate stops) and the other line 
with 2h46min (with 8 intermediate stops). ÖBB has invested in quality (new railjet-trainsets). 
These improvements in travel-time and number of connections were made possible because 
of new investments to upgrade the infrastructure. The number of trains operating on the 
route was overall increased as a result of competition. Westbahn has announced it will offer 
more once more rolling stock becomes available.  
-­‐   Prices: Westbahn offered very low fares and permanent special offers, most of them 
uncontrolled. Their standard fare was at 50% of the regular full-flex ÖBB fare and equalled 
the ÖBB fare for holders of ÖBB-Vorteilscard. Also ÖBB offers a special offer with the 
restriction of having a limited promo-capacity per train. Westbahn has also entered several 
partnerships with regional tickets but later abandoned some of them. 
In spite of the overall positive impact for travellers there are problems with regard to the legal 
framework. Rules for the integration of timetable information and for a possible integration in 
sales platforms are missing. The rules for track access may need to be revised as well as the 
current system has a clear system of prioritization (for instance giving long distance priority over 
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short, international over national), which may not be compatible with fostering open access 
competition. 
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Case Study 2 - Passenger Railway Competition in the Czech 
Republic 
This text is based on the presentation of Dr Zdeněk Tomeš, Masaryk University, at the workshop 
“Competition in the Railway Passenger Market”, Madrid, 16.09.2016.  
 
The Czech railways had been liberalized with the unbundling of infrastructure and services in 
2003. The process was structurally completed with the creation of a fully independent 
infrastructure manager in 2011. Competition in passenger rail (unlike rail freight) had developed 
very slowly at first2.  
One of the peculiarities of the Czech railway market is the fact that almost all railway connections 
are subsidised (operated under public service obligation) on the regional as well as on the 
intercity level.  
 
Table 2 Revenues and Profit in the Czech Republic. 
 
Copyright: Zdeněk Tomeš  
 
While in theory open access competition is allowed on all routes, a new entrant on any 
connection would have to compete with the incumbent operator (České Dráhy, ČD) that receives 
public funding. The Ministry of Transport is, however, entitled to withdraw public funding and 
open connections to on track competition. This has happened once so far on the case of the 
Prague-Ostrava route, where currently several operators compete.   
                                                        
 
2 Non-incumbent operators had a market share of 1.4% in 2011, see Tomeš, 2014 
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The Prague-Ostrava route is one of the main routes in the small country and it has ideal 
conditions for new entrants: high traffic volumes and little intermodal competition because of a 
lack of a direct highway connection. At the same time, the incumbent operator used to charge 
high prices and offered low quality of service, for instance due to using outdated rolling stock. 
Several new entrants with diverse business models entered the market from 2011 on the two most 
important ones being Regio Jet and LeoExpress. The greatest positive outcome (from a 
passenger’s perspective) has been the reduction in fares (see Figure 1) with a simultaneous 
increase in travel volume and service quality. While the incumbent operator has been accused of 
predatory pricing there is no official verdict yet. However, estimates suggest that all the operators 
are currently operating at a loss.  
The problem of predatory pricing is exacerbated by some intrinsic factors. Operators engage in 
such fierce competition partly because they face high sunk costs; some of their rolling stock used 
cannot be used in other countries and would be hard or impossible to sell after a possible exit 
from the market. The second problem that arose in the Czech Republic is capacity constraints due 
to increased congestion: competition has led to a much higher train frequency on the Prague-
Ostrava track because all operators moved to shorter trains with shorter time intervals. This has 
negative impacts for freight operations as passenger trains always have priority in the track 
allocation in the Czech system.  
The Czech Republic is a case of relatively unregulated competition. Clear rules, for instance on 
pricing and fare integration, are not in place. The Competition Authority of the Czech Republic 
lacked staff and experience in the railway sector when it had to deal with claims about anti-
competitive behaviour of the incumbent operator. This experience may well give raise the idea of 
establishing a truly independent railway regulator. Currently the railway regulator is part of the 
Ministry of Transport and has no authority over competition issues. 
 
Figure 1 Average fare prices for rail services in the Czech Republic. 
 
Copyright: Zdeněk Tomeš  
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Case Study 3 - Passenger Rail Competition in Sweden 
This text is based on the presentation of Bertil Hylén, at the workshop “Competition in the Railway 
Passenger Market”, Madrid, 16.09.2016 and the other sources referenced in the text. 
 
Sweden has opened the entire passenger railway market to competition in 2010. Nevertheless the 
incumbent state owned operator SJ has remained in a strong position in spite of some minor 
entries to the market. Recently competitors had operated on a small scale and in niche segments 
that did not challenge SJ. This changed when MTR entered the market on the Stockholm-
Gothenburg line, the country’s busiest route, in March 2015 (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Weekly average prices of Swedish incumbent operator SJ and new entrant MTR. 
 
Source: Vigren, 2016, p. 11 
 
The Hong Kong based corporation MTR had already entered the Swedish market in 2009 for the 
operation of Stockholm’s metro network.3 
Conflict arose upon MTR’s market entry with regard to access to the incumbent’s sales platform. 
When its request to be included in SJ’s online ticket platform was rejected, MTR complained to 
the Swedish Competition Authority. The complaint was dismissed with the authority ruling that 
                                                        
 
3 Competitive tendering is common practice in Sweden: 95% of public transport operations is tendered out 
under the authority of the Passenger Transport Authorities. 
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access to SJ’s sales platforms is not indispensable for market entry. MTR now uses the neutral 
resrobot.se platform.  
Capacity shortages are a serious challenge for railway competition in Sweden. The infrastructure 
manager has to bring together conflicting demands between fast and slow passenger trains and 
freight transport, while priority rules are not well defined in Sweden. Capacity is in principle 
allocated on an annual basis. New entrants, however, need to plan several years ahead. 
It seems that after a relatively short time on the market MTR has affected ticket prices. MTR’s 
cheapest ticket is 10 SEK cheaper than the corresponding ticket of SJ. The incumbent’s ticket 
prices have decreased by 12.8% between March 2015 and June 2016 (Vigren, 2016: p.18). Both the 
incumbent and the competitor have introduced a more dynamic yield management system to 
optimize load factors. This of course means more special offers on the one hand and higher prices 
during peak times such as holiday periods on the other.  
MTR always stresses to seek competition not only with the other rail operators but with the other 
transport modes. They focus on increasing the share of online ticket sales through mobile 
applications and travel platforms and on attracting more business travellers (Barrow, 2015). SJ 
states that competition is generally good as it creates more attention in to the rail sector.  
 
 
14 
 
Case Study 4 - Passenger Railway Competition in Italy 
This text is based on the presentation of Dr Andrea Giuricin, University of Milan Bicocca, at the 
workshop “Competition in the Railway Passenger Market”, Madrid, 16.09.2016 and the other 
sources referenced in the text. 
 
The case of open access competition in Italy has received a lot of attention as it has developed 
quite significantly over the past years. In 2012 competitor NTV entered the high speed rail market 
challenging the incumbent Trenitalia. NTV was founded in 2006 but it took until March 2012 to 
get the final authorization to operate.  
A decree allowing open access competition in Italy is in place since 2001. In the beginning NTV 
filed numerous complaints about the FS Holding (which comprises infrastructure manager and 
the incumbent operator). These complaints mainly regarded access to essential facilities, delays in 
the path application process and predatory pricing by the incumbent. In 2013 Italy’s new 
transport regulator and competition authority (ART) started their operations and supported the 
development of competition with several interventions in the market aimed at ensuring non-
discriminatory conditions. Among other things a significand reduction of track access charges in 
2014 brought down costs for all operators. 
The effects of open access competition in Italy have been quite significant: the overall demand for 
long distance rail transport rose by 65% (in PKM) while the ticket price yield fell by 40% (Figure 
3).  
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Figure 3 Demand, GDP and reduction in ticket prices for high speed rail in Italy. 
 
Copyright: Andrea Giuricin 
Continuously adding new connections on profitable connections the national market share of 
competitor NTV had arrived at 26% in 2016. In spite of having to bare high investment cost in the 
starting phase, NTV is operating at a profit and is currently making investments in new trains. 
Italo is currently operating with 25 high speed trains, but at the end of 2017, 12 more will be 
added.  
Part of this development was also an increase of the overall market share of rail vis-à-vis (low-
cost) air because the cost for available seat kilometres of NTV is now lower than the majority of 
low cost airlines. In fact some routes in Italy have been abandoned by Ryanair as a consequence of 
the competition with high speed rail (Florence School of Regulation, 2014). 
16 
 
Case Study 5 - Passenger Railway Competition in the UK  
This text is based on the presentation of Dr Phill Wheat, ITS Leeds, at the workshop “Competition 
in the Railway Passenger Market”, Madrid, 16.09.2016.  
 
The UK was one of the first countries with a liberalized rail system. Yet open access competition 
(competition in the market) exists only to a very limited extent and the number of cases is actually 
decreasing. The vast majority of train services are operated by government awarded franchises for 
a period of 7 to 15 years preceded by a competitive bidding process (Competition and Market 
Authority (CMA) (2016)).  
Operators need to seek permission from the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) to operate an 
additional train on an existing connection (overlapping franchise) or to offer an alternative route 
to an existing city connection (parallel franchise). In its assessment on whether to allow an open 
access operation the ORR considers among other things the risk that new operations could defer 
revenues from the existing franchises making it likely that they will submit lower bids in future 
tenders (and thus jeopardize funding needed for infrastructure). In addition, the ORR’s has role 
to arbitrate if the infrastructure manager doubts that there is path capacity for such operations. 
The overall evaluation is that the liberalization has boosted passenger numbers and to some 
extent customer satisfaction. At the same time, the operational costs of the railway system are still 
considered too high. Hence the policy context today is mainly concerned with increasing 
efficiency and bringing down cost, whilst maintaining the quality and reliability of the service. 
The ORR is the independent body in charge of overlooking the efficiency of the infrastructure 
manager Network Rail, to guarantee fair access to the infrastructure and to promote competition 
and safety regulation. ORR needs to balance several, sometimes conflicting duties: it has the duty 
to promote competition in the railways and at the same time favour sufficient revenues for the 
infrastructure manager. 
To date there are about 20 franchises in operation. While at the beginning of the liberalization 
process there were financial problems with some of the franchises, their financial situation has 
stabilized by now. Yet the overall cost of providing train services has not fallen as expected and 
thus a priority for the industry is to improve this situation.  
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has recently completed a policy project which 
concluded that one strategy to address this issue and generally increase innovation in the industry 
is to increase the so far limited number of open access competition. There is some evidence that, 
where it is allowed, service levels and customer satisfaction improves. Potential efficiency gains 
were found for instance by an ORR study showing that costs of open access operations are on 
average 30 % lower than the cost of a franchised operation working at the same density of 
operation (Rasmussen et al, 2015)). A second benefit that is observed is the potential of open 
access operators to pressure the network manager to become more efficient. More open access 
competition means overcoming barriers to entry. Legally access to the infrastructure is not an 
obstacle as ORR may not discriminate against an operator applying for access rights. However, 
capacity constraints on many tracks and the often difficult access to rolling stock limit the 
chances of new entrants entering the market. 
It would be important to further investigate financial and other implications of a move towards 
more open access competition on certain routes. If such a path is chosen policy action would need 
to continue to remove such barriers. One such issue relates to access charges and the extent to 
which a greater open access would prevent recovery of fixed costs for the infrastructure manager. 
17 
 
Considering charges based on both marginal cost and avoidable cost offer some potential to 
recover such costs (Office of Rail Regulation, 2016, p23-24). 
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